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Abstract  
Credible analyses and evidence submitted by experts from universities, international organizations 
and independent think tanks show that the trends which led to the 2008 worldwide financial crisis 
remain intact. As a result, central for responsible leaderships should be the concern how to forestall 
the next big one which might prove uncontrollable. Given the world dominance of the U.S. dollar, 
in a 2015 paper I discussed two paths of possible reforms: One bold but gradual, which would en-
tail altering the present institutional setup of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (“the Fed”), 
provided that it maintains control over the Federal Funds Rate (FFR); and, if not, a radical one, 
which would entail replacing the Fed with a monetary regime based on free banking. In this paper I 
go a step further in the latter direction by drawing on the model of free banking that emerged in 
Athens in classical times and enabled the Athenian “empire” to turn the Attic drachma into the dol-
lar of today, throughout the eastern Mediterranean and beyond, without causing major financial 
crises for over two centuries. More specifically, I argue that, even if the said model had not proved 
its potential as a highly successful historical precedent, as banker of the world, the U.S. ought to 
consider it as a benchmark for reference and adaptation, before an unexpected international finan-
cial crisis and/or the revolutionary technological developments in the front of gold-like digital cur-
rencies, precipitate a monetary regime change.    
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the long recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis, responsible leader-
ships in the U.S. behaved as if nothing happened. They had an excuse. By the end of 2019 the U.S. 
economy had returned to growing even above its potential. Unemployment had declined to histori-
cal lows. Monetary authorities had even trouble pushing the inflation rate up to their 2% target rate. 
Asset valuations had resumed their robust upward trend, etc. But many experts from international 
organizations, universities and independent think tanks offered credible analyses and evidence to 
the contrary.1 Not everything is alright, they insisted, because the underlying trends that led to the 
2008 crisis remained intact. For an example, consider the global financial imbalances. According 
to Mohan (2009, 1), then deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI): 
The proximate cause of the current financial turbulence is attributed to the sub-prime mortgage sector 
in the USA.2 At a fundamental level, however, the crisis could be ascribed to the persistence of large 
global imbalances, which, in turn, were the outcome of long periods of excessively loose monetary 
policy in the major advanced economies during the early part of this decade. 
Several years later, Bitros (2015, 70-77) assessed the evidence for the U.S. from where the crisis 
erupted and concluded that culpable for what happened were lax monetary, housing and other pri-
marily systemic bank related policies. Have these anomalies been confronted in the meantime? 
Not really because, beyond certain superficial macro- and micro-prudential interventions, the 
U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (henceforth, “the Fed”) loosened monetary policy to such 
an extent that, even before the adverse shocks of the current coronavirus pandemic, it stood pris-
oner of the dilemma expressed in the following quotation from the Global Financial Stability 
Report of the International Monetary Fund (2018):   
“A more significant tightening in global financial conditions will expose financial vulnerabilities that 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, the most recent assessments by Blinder (2019). 
2
  U.S. banks from within and outside the Federal Reserve System have been consistently encouraged to offer to low 
income households mortgage loans priced at commensurate interest rates. For many years the demand for such 
loans was brisk, their stock accumulated to several trillion U.S. dollars, and banks faced no debt servicing prob-
lems. With the exception of two bank failures in early 2007, the significance of which was missed by the respon-
sible authorities, ominous signals earlier might have been easily construed as regular data blips. However, under 
the semblance of normalcy some very bad trends were evolving. These amounted to increasing rates of unem-
ployment, accompanied by declining labor force participation, increasing poverty, accompanied by declining la-
bor share, and increasing inequality, accompanied by an extraordinary accumulation of income and wealth in the 
top 1% of U.S. households. Therefore, one might reasonably assert that it was not the sub-prime interest rate loans 
or the lax policies that led to the crisis but the declining labor share and the rising poverty which rendered large 
masses of working people unemployed and unable to service their housing loans. Moreover, as argued by Bitros 
(2019), the timing and the severity of the crisis might have been instigated by other forces emanating from the real 
side of the economy, partly independently and partly due to the effects of prior initiatives or lack thereof by mone-
tary and fiscal authorities.   
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have built over the years and will test the resilience of the global financial system.  
By implication, in view of the world dominance of the U.S. dollar, if and when the Fed attempts to 
return to normalcy, they will risk a new global financial crisis. It is a terrible impasse with the stabil-
ity of the international financial system hanging on the balance. 
 Can anything be done to stem another worldwide financial crisis which might become uncon-
trollable under the new international circumstances? In view of the inertia in the status quo, and 
since history suggests that proposals like the one presented by the previous Governor of the Bank 
of England (BOE) are unlikely to materialize,3 looking forward an alternative reform would be 
the one considered in Bitros (2015). This would entail the constitutionalization of the Fed, so as 
it may function in the established system of checks and balances along with the executive, the 
legislative and the judicial powers of the federal government, in conjunction with a legislated 
obligation to follow a monetary rule of its choosing, but known well in advance to economic 
agents. If the Fed retains control over its policy instrument, i.e. the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), 
this reform might prove effective, even though it is doubtful whether it can pass through the U.S. 
Congress under normal circumstances. However, if further research continues to ascertain the 
lack of such control or in the advent of an unexpected worldwide crisis, which might precipitate 
an urgent shift towards a monetary regime change, the best reform would be to scrap the Fed and 
opt for an Athenian type model of free banking, which combines a Uniform Official Currency 
(UOC) unit with private production of commodity-like money in competitive markets along with 
all other goods and services. 4   
 The objectives in this paper are threefold. First, to highlight the structure of the Athenian model 
of money and banking; second, to assess its properties by reference to the standard of price stabil-
ity, which has been used traditionally in gauging the effectiveness of monetary arrangements in 
contemporary market economies;5 and, lastly, to explain why this model may serve as a benchmark 
                                                 
3
  See Karni (2019). Libra is a digital currency that the giant U.S. company Facebook Inc. plans to introduce and 
manage as part of its worldwide social media network.  However, as of August 2019, its launching continued to 
remain under consideration. 
4
  Scrapping the Fed and central banks in general and replacing them with monetary systems based on commodity 
currencies and competitive banks all possessing equal rights to trade is not recommended only by the successful 
historical precedent of Athens in classical times. In addition, it has long been proposed in the voluminous litera-
ture in the tradition of Smith (1936/1990). For a review and assessment of this literature see Sechrest (1992/2009), 
5
  Aside of the traditional metric of price stability, monetary arrangements in contemporary market economies are 
tasked to achieve low unemployment, economic growth in line with the economy’s productive potential, and moder-
ate long term interest rates. For a comparative assessment of such arrangements in classical Athens and the U.S in 
the postwar period with regard to the latter three criteria, see Bitros, Economou, Kyriazis (2020, Chapter 7). 
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for reference and adaptation, should  the established central banking order crumble under the bur-
den of its internal inconsistencies and/or an unexpected implosion of the international financial sys-
tem. After a short digression in the next section to single out a few key rudiments of state govern-
ance and money in classical Athens and the United States (U.S.), the organization of the paper fol-
lows the above objectives in the same order.   
2. The institutional background of the model  
The Athenian democracy was ruled by three entities: The Ecclesia of Demos (congregation of 
citizens) or Assembly; the Council of 500 or Boule; and the Dikastiria or Courts. The Assembly 
comprised all adult male Athenian citizens, exercised the top decision-making authority, in-
cluding legislative and select ultimate-degree judicial and auditing powers. It convened four 
times during each prytany (tenth of the conciliar year), which lasted from 36 to 39 days, and at 
least forty times per year in total. It could be in session only when more than 6,000 citizens 
were present. One of the four meetings of each prytaneia was devoted to discussion and deci-
sion-making on issues of governance, defense, foreign policy, provisioning of food and other 
supplies, including welfare, while the other three dealt with various issues. The Boule consist-
ed of ten groups with 50 members each from the 10 tribes of Athens. The 50 members of each 
tribe served in the Boule for one tenth of each year and were replaced by another group at the 
end of each prytany. Thus, in practical terms, each tribe that held this post actually ruled Ath-
ens with full executive rights. Among their other duties were to supervise the execution of the 
state budget, to manage the treasuries of the gods, and to oversee the operations of the mint.  
From these well-established historical details, it follows that Athens was governed by direct 
democracy. In this system of governance the interests of those who govern coincide with the 
interests of those who are governed and thus it was to the benefit of all to manage the finances 
of the state and the currency as prudently as their own. Beyond this fundamental institutional 
feature, from Bitros, Economou, Kyriazis (2020) it is worth noting that Athens: 
 Did not run systematic budget deficits, nor did it borrow from private markets in cases of 
unexpected revenue shortfalls. Instead, in affluent years they donated part of the budget 
surplus to the treasuries of the gods6 and these funds together with those from private 
                                                 
6
 These were shrines devoted to gods that served various religious and social purposes and managed particular treas-
ures. For example, the treasury of Athena managed the treasures of Parthenon. They functioned as bankers to the 
state during peacetimes and as lenders of last resort in periods of war. They were run by a group of magistrates 
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donations to the shrines remained available for the state to borrow on interest in cases of 
extreme and unexpected circumstances.  
 Maintained control over the standards and the organizational safeguards to protect the in-
tegrity of its silver currency; pushed for the adoption of Attic drachma among its allies 
but without ever forbidding explicitly the parallel circulation of currencies within its bor-
ders;7 and operated a mint where the state as well as anybody who had silver bullion 
might convert it into drachmae at a small fabrication and seigniorage cost.  
By contrast to the preceding, the system of governance in the U.S. is representative democracy; 
according to Franklin (2005, 87), the interests of politicians-agents–representatives align only 
rarely with those of the principals-citizens; public finances are managed in line with the short-
term and expedient interests of those in power at any one time, thus resulting in systematic budg-
et deficits and unsustainable public debts; and hence, as a result, given the dominance of the U.S. 
dollar in world transactions, monetary policies driven by U.S. national interests may destabilize 
the international financial system at any time and bring about another worldwide financial crisis, 
which under the current international circumstances might become uncontrollable.  
Finally, before embarking on the main tasks, a clarification is in order regarding the distinction 
between the terms “coins”, “coinage” and “currency”, on the one hand, and “money” on the other.8 
Cohen (1990, 2008) has established beyond any doubt that the banks in classical Athens created 
credit by a multiple of the deposits they received.9 However, apart from this common feature, those 
                                                                                                                                                             
called tamiai (treasurers). The latter were appointed for one year, operated under the supervision of the Council, 
and they were relieved of responsibility only after strict audit. 
7
 Presumably, in the Solonian tradition, whatever was not forbidden explicitly by the laws it was considered legal be-
havior. Therefore, when  Ober (2008, 225) writes that Nicophon’s Law provides: 
… for the tacit certification of certain silver foreign coins as good, and for the confiscation of bad coins, 
in essence, Ober,  Rhodes, Osborne (2003, 113), Engen (2005, 370) and others, who hold the same view, agree that 
it was market forces that determined whether and to what extent coins issued  and stamped as Attic by various 
foreign  states circulated in parallel in Athens. Should there be any doubt about this interpretation, here is how 
Shipton (1997, 408) reinforces it:  
We thus appear to have an open system where 'good' imitation owls are free to circulate alongside silver 
currency from Attica. And since only the tester in the Piraeus is a new appointment, it is clear that at 
some point between the setting up of the board of the nomothetai and the decree itself, Athens had al-
ready taken steps to ensure an open system. 
8
  In addition to “money” circulated in classical Athens many “near money” substitutes.. The  latter is defined as any-
thing, tangible or intangible (e.g. promissory or any other form of commitment to a future money payment) that 
proves itself good enough in value preserving properties as well as in convenience and low transactions cost to out-
perform barter. Below the focus turns exclusively on “money” in the form of currency, bullion, and bank credits.  
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banks differed from the ones of more recent decades in the following notable respects: a) the cur-
rency they dealt with was silver coins and bullion convertible into coins on demand at the state 
mint; b) their so-called base money consisted of coins and bullion they themselves owned and/or 
derived from primary deposits by wealthy citizens, metics10and treasuries of the gods; c) second-
ary or derivative deposits in the amount of primary deposits times the inverse of the reserve ratio 
emanated from advances of bank loans for consumption and production purposes; and d) since 
there was no central bank to generate for them base money and require that they apply a specific 
reserve ratio, the banks determined it along with all other variables in the monetary system. Does 
the absence of an exogenously imposed reserve ratio imply that the Athenian banks were very 
prudent and abstained from creating excessive amounts of credit? Not necessarily.11  Some banks 
did issue excess credit and from Cohen (1992, 215-224) we know that a number of them failed. 
But given that depositors had all the incentives to guard against banks which overextended in the 
quantity and the quality of loans that they advanced, on the whole banks should have practiced re-
straint from the fear of having to face a run by their depositors.  
3. The Athenian model of free banking in classical times 
The objective in this section is to explain how, by mediating between savers and borrowers in the 
fully competitive environment that evolved over time, the Athenian banks determined the quanti-
ty and composition of money in the form of silver drachmae, silver bullion, primary bank depos-
its and bank loans, along with other key variables like the reserve ratio and the interest rate.   
 Demand and supply of currency and bullion  3.1
In the Athenian economy there functioned two markets for silver, one for silver in the form of cur-
rency and another in the form of bullion. Both markets were closely interconnected because, as I 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
   Research interest in the range of activities of the Athenian banks in classical times antedates Cohen’s (1990, 2008) 
definitive assessment of the available historical evidence by several centuries. For example, from the study by 
Vernadakis (1881) we learn that the first attempt to put together an account of the evidence was undertaken in a 
dissertation by Claude de Salmasio in 1740.    
10
  This term refers to citizens from other city-states who were residing in Athens for work. 
11
 Nor does it imply that the banks were in any discernible ways less avaricious than banks today.  The critical dif-
ference is that ancient Athenian bankers had no central banker to blame if their business collapsed and they could 
not shift the costs of their errors on to the taxpayers. On the contrary, today a central bank with its monopoly 
power on the quantity of fiat money ends up with significant co-responsibility with the so-called systemic banks 
and this explains why selectively they may bail banks out upon imminent default. In this respect, recall that in the 
U.S and the U.K in 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt whereas financial behemoths like Merrill Lynch, Fred-
die Mac, Fannie Mae, Royal Bank of Scotland and Alliance & Leicester all came very close to defaulting and had 
to be rescued.  
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indicated earlier, for some relatively small cost bullion could be converted on demand into coins at 
the Mint. Hence, the supply of currency in every period was equal to the quantity of bullion that 
was worth holding in the form of coins on the grounds of its purchasing power in terms of goods 
and services; Or, more accurately, it was equal to the quantity of bullion worth holding in the form 
of coins on the grounds of its purchasing power in terms of goods and services all over the then 
known world, because the economy was completely open and local silver markets for currency and 
bullion coincided with the international ones. In this framework, let the purchasing power of 
drachma be denoted by a continuum of prices cp  and the quantities of the currency offered in ex-
change for goods and services at these prices by the symbol cS .12 The pairs of ( , )c cS p define the 
supply side of the market for currency. Moving next to the other side of the market, assume that at 
the prices cp the providers of goods and services offer to purchase cD quantities of currency, and 
hence that the pairs ( , )c cD p describe their demand for currency.13In the jargon of contemporary 
economic analysis the aspect that would attract attention at this point would be the mechanism by 
which the supply and demand for currency arrived at equilibrium.14  
Figure 1 in the next page highlights this issue. Graph (i) depicts the above-defined curves of 
the demand and supply of currency. The supply curve has been drawn in an upward sloping fash-
ion because it is reasonable to assume that, as the price of the currency in term of goods and ser-
vices increases, e.g. if a plentiful harvest or extraordinary loads of grain from the Euxine came to 
the market in Athens, bullion holders would be motivated to convert more and more of its quan-
tity into currency.15 On the contrary, regarding those who demand currency by offering goods 
                                                 
12
 In the past several renowned economists have insisted that money is as subject to supply and demand as any other 
good or service. For example Mill (1923, 490) writes: 
   …the value or purchasing power of money depends, in the first instance, on demand and supply. 
But demand and supply, in relation to money, present themselves in a somewhat different shape from 
the demand and supply of other things…whoever sells corn, or tallow, or cotton, buys money. Who-
ever buys bread, or wine or clothes, sells money. 
13
 It was  mentioned earlier that in various periods there circulated in Athens privately fabricated and monitored but 
state backed small change coins made of bronze whose metallic value was far less than its nominal worth. These 
constituted in essence a form of fiat currency. However, by all historical accounts, their amount was insignificant 
relative to that of the silver currency in circulation and on this ground in the analysis that follows I ignore it alto-
gether. For further documentation on this issue, see Cohen (2008, 68-69).    
14
 It should be clear that at the microeconomic level there are as many supply and demand pairs for currency as there 
are goods and services. But here I shall conduct the analysis as if all goods and services have been aggregated into 
a single homogeneous commodity.  
15
 Notice that this constitutes a significant departure from the textbook assumption of a fixed or central bank deter-
mined supply of currency. To follow on the example, the elastic supply of currency from the stock of bullion that 
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and services, it is reasonable to assume that, as its price rises they will reduce the quantities that 
they are willing to purchase. This explains why the curve of the demand for currency has been 
drawn as downward sloping. But the interests of buyers and sellers of currency are opposite, be-
cause those who sell currency for goods and services wish to buy low, whereas those who sell 
goods and services for currency wish to sell high. Consequently, repeated exchanges among 
them are bound to lead to a position where everybody is satisfied with the results.  Economists 
call this position equilibrium. In the Graph (i) this situation is shown at point A where the quanti-
ty of currency and price that prevail are marked by the symbols ( , )c cq p . At that price of the cur-
rency, Graph (ii) shows that from the total available quantity of bullion qˆ , quantity cq would be 
converted into currency and the remaining ˆ cq q  would be traded in the form of bullion and 
other wares from this precious metal. 
 Next, suppose that while the production of goods and services increases, the overall quanti-
ty of the available silver bullion remains fixed at qˆ . How would this change affect the allocation 
of bullion between currency and commodity uses? Since silver in the form of currency would 
become dearer in terms of goods and services, more of the silver in the form of bullion would be 
expected to be converted into currency and a new equilibrium would be established at point B in 
which the equilibrium values would be 1 1 1( , , )c c bq p q . Using the same analytical apparatus, the op-
                                                                                                                                                             
Athenians held for no other reason than speculation provided the means to accommodate endogenously the shock 
of the increased supply of goods.  In Athens therefore relative prices changed to cushion any shocks on the de-
mand or the supply side of the markets, whereas nowadays shocks must be identified by central banks before they 
are able to prevent, if at all, the possible destabilization of the economy.  
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posite case could be examined also in which the production of goods and services remains fixed 
and the overall quantity of bullion increases, as happened in the case of the discovery of the Lau-
rion mines in 483 BC. In that event, goods and services became dearer in terms of silver bullion 
and certainly some of its available quantity was converted into currency. But how much currency 
was necessary each time to carry out efficiently the transactions on the goods and services that 
were produced was determined in the two markets through the mechanism of relative prices and 
the competition between the opposing interests of currency buyers and sellers in terms of goods 
and services. So, in effect, one function of a modern central bank was performed by the stock of 
bullion that cushioned the shocks in the goods and services markets. Except that the stock was not 
held monopolistically by one organization, but by many individual and uncoordinated speculators 
who stood to make a profit or suffer a loss depending on the particular nature of the shocks. 
The preceding analysis is partial in a very important respect. This has to do with the following 
considerations. The stocks of currency and bullion in the economy bore no interest. By implication 
those who held purchasing power in the forms of highly liquid currency and slightly less liquid 
bullion lost the opportunity to make a deposit in a bank and earn interest. Economists would say 
that they absorbed an opportunity cost. This cost motivated the holders of wealth in these forms to 
try and allocate it among currency, bullion and bank deposits so as to maximize their benefits. 
Hence, in addition to the markets in Figure 1, certainly there was one more, i.e. that for bank de-
posits, which needs to be integrated into the analysis. This issue is taken up next.  
 Demand and supply of bank deposits 3.2
As indicated earlier, Athenian banks provided a range of services much like contemporary banks. 
One of these services was that they accepted deposits and paid interest on them. By virtue of the 
voluminous empirical evidence in this regard, particularly in the 4th century BCE, it is credible to 
assume that there was a banking market where, on the demand side, bankers were competing to 
attract deposits by paying the lowest possible interest rate, whereas on the supply side house-
holds, enterprises and treasuries of the gods,16 searched around to make deposits at the highest 
possible interest rates, but considering also the reputation and the riskiness of the bankers whom 
they would trust with their money. Figure 2 expands on Figure 1 in several ways. The first is the 
                                                 
16
 In the financial markets the treasuries of the gods acted also like banks lending money at interest. For example, 
based on a stele from the Athenian demos of Rhamnous, Davies (2001, 117–128) reports that accounting records 
pertaining to the management of the monies of their goddess Nemesis show that the treasury lent about 4 talents at 
about 7 percent and earned about 1.7 talents of interest in seven years.  
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introduction in Graph (ii) of an additional axis which measures the quantity of deposits that be-
come available in the economy through a process by means of which economic agents strive to 
reallocate their current holdings of silver currency, ˆ cq , bullion, ˆbq , and  deposits, ˆdq , so as to 
reap the highest possible benefits. The reallocation is achieved with the help of the relative price 
of the currency cp , the implicit relative price of bullion (1 )cp e , e being a percentage rate of 
cost for converting bullion into currency, the reserve ratio k , the inverse of which banks multiply  
primary deposits, and the interest rate r , which indexes the relative benefit of giving up present  
or future liquidity. Points marked by an A in Graphs (i)-(iii) show an initial allocation among 
`11 
 
these three components of money ˆmq , for 0ˆ ,  0 1,  and 0d crq kq k k k e     .17 So let us trace 
through the changes which would take effect in the previous example of an increase in the pro-
duction of goods and services in the economy, holding the available quantity of bullion constant. 
The change would shift curve cD in Graph (i) to the position 1cD . In turn, the equilibrium price of 
currency in terms of goods and services would rise from 1 to  
c cp p , and as a result the equilibrium 
quantity of currency would increase from 1 to  
c cq q . 
Looking next at Graph (ii), observe that the rise in the use of currency would come about part-
ly from a reduction in the form of money held in bullion, the quantity of which would decline 
from 1 to 
b bq q , and partly from a reduction in the deposits held by bankers. What would happen 
in the market for deposits is shown in Graph (iii). As deposits would decline with the shift from
1 to 
d dS S , the equilibrium interest rate and quantity of deposits would shift from point A to B. In 
particular, at the latter point the equilibrium interest rate would increase from 1 to r r , whereas the 
equilibrium quantity of deposits would decline from 1 to 
d dq q .18 This analysis explains the chain of 
changes in response to an isolated increase in the production of goods and services. But it remains 
mute regarding the nature of the interest rate r and it is in need of some further explanation.   
   Graph (iii) represents the segment of the money market that has to do with the demand and 
supply of primary deposits. Keeping with the preceding analysis I ought to have symbolized the 
equilibrium interest rate for deposits as dr , because this would represent the interest rate that the 
banks offer to depositors in order to secure the quantity of deposits dq . Instead I used the symbol 
r so that I may have the opportunity to elucidate this important issue. Recall that when a certain 
amount of currency or bullion is deposited with the banks, they use it to extend interest bearing 
loans by the multiple of the inverse of their reserve-ratio k ; To attract the equilibrium quantity of 
base money dq (see Graph (iii)), assume that Athenians banks offered to depositors the interest 
                                                 
17
 Notice that in the definition of money, denoted by ˆmq , I have included the so-called high-power or primary depos-
its. For the Athenian model of fully decentralized regime of money and banking analyzed here this may be consid-
ered a narrow definition of money. A broader definition should include also secondary or derivative deposits in the 
amount of ˆ ˆ( )cr dq q , ˆ crq  being the total amount of credit that the banking system generated at the reserve ratio k .    
18
 So, a plentiful harvest in Attica or abundant supplies of grain shipped from abroad meant that the interest rate also 
rose.  Except that the rise was moderated by the stock of bullion that was serving the same purpose in smoothing 
real economic shocks as is served today by financial market speculators. 
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rate dr . In a competitive business environment, the interest rate on loans r (see Graph (iv)), and 
hence on credit, has to be consistently aligned with the interest rate the banks pay to depositors, 
because in general dr r .19 How might this be achieved? The simplest conceptualization is to 
postulate that the demand curve for deposits dD in Graph (iii) includes an interest rate for the 
attraction of deposits from households and enterprises. With this issue settled, let me now ad-
dress the equilibrium in the credit market.   
 Demand and supply of bank credit20 3.3
In Figure 2 relevant to the analysis of the market for credit or loans is Graph (iv). Let us concen-
trate first on the determinants of the curve labeled crS which stands for the supply of credit. Ac-
tive on this side of the market were financial and non-financial intermediaries, including individ-
ual Athenians not necessarily rich. For example, aside from the treasuries of the gods, which act-
ed like banks, Harris (2002, 81) reports several cases of small loans advanced by non-
professional lenders. Also, in order to facilitate the selling of their goods and services, enterpris-
es offered credit to buyers. From a legal point of view selling on credit was forbidden. But de 
facto in everyday commercial relations such transactions were quite widespread (see for example 
Cohen (1992, 14)) and affected the overall supply of credit by expanding or contracting the out-
standing stock of “trade credit”. These written debt claims could be transferred to third parties 
(Cohen ibid., 14-18). Yet as is the case today, advances of such credit as well as loans offered by 
isolated individuals should have been limited in scale relative to the total, so they are assumed not 
to have played a decisive role in the determination of the equilibrium in the credit market. For this 
reason I shall concentrate on the role of financial intermediaries, i.e. banks.  
Since they accepted deposits and extended loans, it does not take much theorizing to establish 
that banks affected the supply of credit through three channels.21 The first and very likely the 
most important was the well-known multiplier mechanism. In particular, drawing on the realiza-
tion that only a limited proportion of the deposits they kept was withdrawn each period, banks 
                                                 
19
 Credit-money generated through bank loans is less liquid than bank deposits; So, these forms of money have an 
important difference, which is reflected in an interest rate differential. How larger is the average interest rate on 
loans in comparison to the average interest rate offered on deposits depends on factors like the operating costs of 
the banks, the pricing of default risks on their loans, the robustness of competition in the money market, etc.  
20
 Unless otherwise specified, henceforth the terms “credit” and “loans” will be used interchangeably. 
21
 It should be noted that this is the first instance in the analysis that I refer to credit creation by banks. As it will 
become apparent shortly my conceptualization is that in classical Athens money consisted of the currency, i.e. the 
Attic drachma, silver bullion readily convertible into currency at a small minting cost, and bank credit.  
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felt confident about their liquidity to lend out the rest in the form of business and consumer 
loans. But some part of the latter returned to banks as new deposits. So they continued lending 
up to a limit which corresponded to so many times the initial deposit as it was warranted by the 
inverse of the reserve-ratio
 k  that they applied at the time. The explanation of this process and its 
documentation by Cohen (2008, 76-83) leaves no doubt that the Athenian banks did create credit 
in the same way systemic banks do in present day democracies. More specifically, looking at the 
Graphs (iii)-(iv) in Figure 2, it is unlikely to miss that the money market determined not only the 
equilibrium interest rate r  but the equilibrium reserve-ratio 0k k  as well. For, the latter can be 
computed readily by dividing the volume of the equilibrium credit crq (see Graph (iv)) by the 
equilibrium rate of deposits dq (see Graph (iii)). 
 The second channel was the amount of base money, which consisted of the amounts of currency 
held by banks in the form of coins and coins-equivalent of bullion, i.e. ˆ ˆ( )c bq p e q  . If the price of 
the currency in terms of goods and services increased above the price of the bullion plus the charges 
for the latter’s monetization, i.e. a fixed unit cost e for seigniorage and operating costs of the mint, 
the banks would be motivated to convert into currency silver bullion they owned and possibly even 
from the quantities they held for safekeeping purposes for their customers. Perhaps because they 
found no evidence of such episodes or they construed them to be insignificant relatively to the mass 
of coins in circulation, neither Cohen (1992, 2008) nor Amemiya (2007) make any reference to such 
endogenously induced conversions of bullion into coins, and vice versa. But given that the mint was 
open to such business, the hypothesis that the banks were guided by the price mechanism to the op-
timal allocation between currency and silver bullion is credible.  
Finally, regarding the third channel, it is helpful to recall from the earlier discussion that, with 
the exception of state intervention in the determination of the prices of cereals, foodstuffs like oil 
and fish, and charcoal, markets were totally free and the same held true for the parallel circula-
tion of domestic and foreign currencies.22 Hence, technically speaking, the position of the crS
curve in Graph (iv) would be subject to the arbitrage that economic agents might be motivated to 
undertake depending on the differences in the relative prices including the interest rate r . For if, 
                                                 
22
 The issue of price controls in classical Athens is a mute one. Migeotte (2009, 143-152) has looked into the nature 
of the influences of the state on the prices of the aforementioned commodities and in page 149 he concludes that: 
…It thus seems that, in practice, the fixing of wholesale and retail prices depended primarily on nego-
tiations between the merchants and the magistrates, and on the magistrates’ power of persuasion. 
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for example, the rise in the productivity of the economy or the discovery of new trade routes 
shifted curve crS to the position 1
crS , thus raising the equilibrium interest rate from r to 1r , and 
this rise was considered undue in the light of the financial conditions that prevailed abroad, other 
things remaining equal, importing of coins and bullion would shift the curve 1
crS to the right and 
the amount of equilibrium credit would shift from 1 to 
cr crq q .  
Turning next to curve crD in Graph (iv), the demand for loans stemmed from domestic and 
foreign borrowers and aimed mostly for productive purposes.23 In general the loans were secured 
by property collaterals worth at least double the value of the loans and the interest rate they car-
ried varied depending on the risk of the venture for which the loans were advanced and other 
considerations.24 Examples abound. Amemiya (2007, 86-87) for instance describes in detail the 
terms and the interest rates lenders charged for bottomry loans. They varied on account of the 
risks of the journey and the season that it took place, since ship losses during winter times were 
higher than similar journeys during summers. The view that emerges from the evidence is that 
much like today there prevailed a whole structure of interest rates which moved up or down de-
pending on the direction in which the conditions in the credit market moved the equilibrium in-
terest rate. In other words, assuming that the credit market determined a basic relatively riskless 
interest rate, the structure of interest rates guided lenders on how to adjust it in order to reflect 
the circumstances that applied to the particular borrowers, the intended uses of the loans, the 
quality of the property offered for security, etc.25  
                                                 
23
 In the relevant literature there is a lengthy debate regarding the nature of the loans that were advanced by Atheni-
an bankers. Before the 1980s the dominant position was that the loans were mostly for consumption. However, 
when the evidence was revisited by Cohen (1990) it became apparent that the methods by which researchers had 
selected and assessed the evidence were subjective and biased towards the hypothesis that they wished to confirm. 
Since then the balance of opinion has changed and now most of economic historians side with the view that the loans 
were advanced predominantly for productive purposes. In the analysis I adopt the latter view and extend it to include 
loans for trading as well as pure speculation. But it should be clear that the consistency of the analysis and the con-
clusions derived from it do not depend on the nature of the loans. Even though I am fully aware of the significant 
implications of this issue, whether Athenians borrowed for consumptive or productive purposes, the market for loans 
would determine an equilibrium interest rate and this is sufficient in the present research endeavor.     
24
 It should be clear that the volume of acceptable “bankable” collateral would be a strongly limiting factor restrain-
ing credit growth and enhancing stability in the economy. But at the same time it would retard economic growth 
by curtailing the expansion of the money supply. 
25
 Presumably a “relatively riskless” interest rate would reflect only the rate of time preference. As such it would 
have to be positive, and hence the whole structure of the interest rates in the economy would be positive. Now 
compare this stylized feature of the Athenian economy to the negative interest rates that have emerged in recent 
years in contemporary market economics. This is another distinct difference between an economy without a cen-
tral bank and commodity-based money produced in competitive markets as every other good and service and an 
economy with a central bank and fiat money, which may carry a negative price, even in the absence of inflation.  
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Drawing on the above, let us return again to the question that was posed earlier regarding the 
equalization of the equilibrium interest rates in the markets for deposits and loans. Consider an 
equilibrium interest rate r  in the credit market which is higher than r . The margin of the former 
interest rate over the latter would signify that the bankers are able to make a pure profit rate 26 on 
the deposits they manage to attract. However, in a competitive market with uninhibited circulation of 
information this situation cannot last for long. The reason is that the pure profit on the part of bankers 
will motivate enough depositors to withdraw deposits and instead become themselves direct lenders. 
As a result, while the curve  dS  in Graph (iii) would start moving slowly rightwards, thus leading to 
a downward pressure on the equilibrium rate for deposits, the curve  crS  in Graph (iv) would move 
rightwards more violently as bankers lose deposits. Hence, eventually, as the interest rate r in the 
loans market declines faster than the interest rate in the market for deposits, the two interest rates 
would come to rest in the same lower equilibrium interest rate, which allows the bankers to earn only 
the normal net rate of profit, which by assumption is included in curve dD  of Graph (iii).      
 Equilibrium in the money market 3.4
Figure 2 depicts in graphical terms the fundamental blocks which constituted the monetary module 
of the Athenian economy in classical times, and particularly in the 4th century BC. It can be ex-
panded by adding modules so as to integrate it with the production of output, the generation of la-
bor and capital incomes, the tax and expenditure operations of the government, etc. Then the mod-
el would reflect more realistically the details of how the real and the monetary sectors of the econ-
omy functioned. I shall push the analysis a bit further in this direction later on. But what I wish to 
do here is to summarize the findings regarding the process of convergence to and the properties of 
the equilibrium in the money market.    
In the confines of the markets in Figure 2, money consisted of three components: Bullion, cur-
rency and bank deposits. On this basis, it has been shown that their equilibrium quantities were ful-
ly determined and indeed in a manner that households, non-financial enterprises and bankers 
should have been pleased with the results, because they achieved the best realization of their plans. 
These results did not come about easily for them. For, they had to compete fiercely even for mar-
                                                                                                                                                             
Hence, given that in the latter economy citizens are forced to succumb to the monopoly power of an unelected au-
thority, benevolent or not, the institutional setup lacks democratic legitimacy  
26
 I call this profit rate “pure” to signify that it is over and above a “normal” profit rate required by banks to stay in 
the business of banking. By assumption the latter is included in the curve dD  in Graph (iii).    
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ginal gains. But in this process they were guided effectively in the process of adjusting their plans 
by three relative prices. The implicit price of silver bullion cp e  ; the price of the currency in 
terms of goods and services cp  (see Graph (i));  and the price of credit in the form of the additional 
consumption in some future date, if one is willing to part with one’s present consumption, which is 
indexed by equilibrium interest rate for bank loans r (see Graph (iv)). 
Moreover, aside from the above first best results for all participants who persevered to the equilib-
rium point, the results turned out to be also first best for the economy as a whole, because the money 
market allocated the available quantity of bullion into currency, deposits and bank loans in the most 
efficient manner. To establish this proposition, assume that in Athens existed at the time a central 
bank which, in order to stimulate investment and economic growth, imposed an upper limit to the 
interest rate below its equilibrium level r . In this administratively set interest rate the demand for 
loans would be higher than the supply and the loans market shown in Graph (iv) would split into of-
ficial and unofficial. If one were able at all to obtain loans in the unofficial market, one would have to 
pay interest rates even higher than the equilibrium interest rate which would have prevailed in the 
absence of the said constraint. To keep the analysis brief, the new allocation of the available bullion 
would be second best for the economy, because it would involve fewer deposits, fewer loans, and 
more hoarding, thus defeating the intended results of the central bank policy.  
Could a central bank under any circumstances improve on the results of the money market 
in a monetary system like the one depicted in Figure 2? Definitely not, because the central 
bank, first, ought to have better information about the actual conditions that prevail in the mar-
kets than the market participants themselves, and, second, it ought to be able to simulate the 
preferences of market participants in advance. But this is an impossible problem to solve, be-
cause the central bank cannot know the preferences of market participants before they are re-
vealed by their choices.27  
Hidden in the above analysis is the following serious social problem which cannot be ignored. 
Regarding the market process in Figure 2, there is no doubt anymore that the great majority of par-
ticipants as well as the state come out winners in terms of both freedoms and material wellbeing. 
                                                 
27
 It is likely that some readers aware of advanced economic theory may remind us of Samuelson’s (1948) theorem 
of revealed preferences. I hasten to add that, even if the central bank were able to predict precisely the preferences 
of market participants, it would still need to have an automatic feedback mechanism to continuously adjust its 
policies to the changing circumstances in the markets, and indeed not alone in the money markets. But the design 
and implementation of such a mechanism lie in the domain of wishful thinking.   
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But there are also people who take part in various stages of the process and, for reasons that are not 
of the present to explain, they are left behind or pushed aside. Athenians were very mindful of the 
social imperative to control income and wealth inequality between certain socially optimal bounds 
as the latter were understood by the majority of the citizens who participated in the Assembly.28 
Between equality of the ends and equality of the means, they placed in actuality the emphasis on 
the equality of the means, i.e. education and the enlargement of opportunities for all to thrive through 
commerce and open markets. Yet, at the same time, the state provided for a social net, sufficiently 
safe to cover those who failed despite their earnest efforts to succeed, but also limited enough to 
discourage corruption and abuses. In retrospect, it was an experiment in search of economic effi-
ciency within an environment of social cohesion, which was met with remarkable success.  
  Sum up 3.5
Money in classical Athens consisted of three components. The base money in the form of silver 
coins; silver held in the form of bullion readily convertible into coins at a small fabrication and sei-
gniorage charge at the state mint; and loans advanced by banks to their customers for consumption 
and production purposes. The stock of the base money that circulated in the economy at any given 
time was determined by economic agents interacting in the money market. If in terms of goods and 
services the value of the drachma was higher than its silver content plus the conversion cost, bul-
lion holders would sense the opportunity for profit and, by turning enough silver into coins at the 
state mint, equilibrium would be established in the demand and supply for coins. On the contrary, 
whenever the opposite happened and in terms of goods and services the value of drachma fell be-
low that of its silver content, equilibrium between demand and supply for coins was established by 
melting enough of them for their silver content. One does not find instances of such events, but that 
was certainly a possibility. This key result, that is, that the stock of coins was determined endoge-
nously in the economy, emanated from the fundamental institutional arrangement that the state 
mint stood ready at some cost to turn bullion into coins on demand. 
Presumably part of the base money (coins and billion) was stashed away in response to the 
demand for hoarding;29 a second part, multiplied by the so called “velocity of circulation” 
                                                 
28
 Admittedly, given the instability of Athenian political life in comparison with the glacial stagnation of, say, Spar-
ta, those social bounds must not have been too stable. 
29
 Quite certainly wealthy Athenians did keep a part of their riches in Attic drachmae, either at home or in bank 
vaults. To the extend they did, they practiced hoarding which implies that the amount of currency involved was 
eliminated from circulation.    
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was used to carry out the volume of transactions that took place each year, and still a third 
part was deposited with the banks to earn extra income in the form of interest. Since coins in 
hand, coins in hoarding vaults, and bullion returned no interest, how households and ente r-
prises allocated their holdings in means of payment among currency, bullion, deposits and 
loans, was determined by the price mechanism in the framework of the markets exhibited in 
Figure 2.  In particular, with the intermediation of banks, household and enterprises were 
brought into impersonal contact with households and enterprises possessing portfolios of
(currency ,bullion ,deposits , loans )c b d crq q q q    , which, under appropriate market condi-
tions, stood ready to restructure into (currency ,bullion ,deposits , loans )c b d crq q q q    , given 
for example a change in the demand for loans from  to cr crq q . Depending on the direction of this 
change, the prevailing interest r would increase (decrease), say to r , the deposits at the banks 
would rise (decline) to dq , and the latter would respond by expanding (shrinking) credit at the 
multiple of the inverse of their reserve-ratio. These adjustments would bring about equilibrium in 
the markets for bank loans and deposits. But in the process, the change in bank deposits would 
force the prices in the markets for currency and bullion to change in the directions
 and c c b bp p p p  . Finally, as these price changes would take effect, the desired quantities of 
currency and bullion would change as follows:  and c c b bq q q q  . In short, all financial mar-
kets adjusted optimally to accommodate in this case the change in the demand for loans, but the 
same would happen given any other change like for instance an influx of specie into the econo-
my, a shift in the seigniorage margin at the mint, or even changes in psychological factors that 
might influence the propensity to hoarding and hence the velocity of circulation.  
Central to the aforementioned sequence of adjustments from the one equilibrium position to 
the other was the determination by financial markets of the equilibrium reserve-ratio in the bank-
ing sector. What percentage of each deposit banks retained in order to safeguard their ability to 
cover withdrawals at any given time was then as paramount as it is today in the prevailing “frac-
tional-reserve” monetary systems. But in classical Athens there was no lender of last resort and 
the banks were obliged to hedge against risks on their own by balancing their urge for profit 
against the trust and the loyalty of their depositors.30 Some banks, like the one run by Passion, 
                                                 
30
 There definitely existed a stock of bullion that could be struck quickly and cheaply into coins and lent out at some 
“penalty rates”. The treasuries of the gods were also, most likely, not fully invested as manifested by the calls on 
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managed the inherent risks with success and became famous, whereas others failed and vanished 
into historical oblivion together with the deposits of their customers.  
4. Assessments regarding the stability of the general price level 
Presently, when we refer to prices, we think either about the changes in the general price level 
and talk about the issues of inflation-deflation, or about the changes in the relative prices and 
talk about the flexibility of markets to adjust to endogenous shifts and exogenous shocks. From 
Loomis (1998, 240-250), but not only, we know that for Athens in classical times the relevant 
evidence is extant and that it relates to changes not in the general price level, but in the prices of 
select sectors of goods and services, and indeed in a limited range of them. So, it is impossible to 
assess the performance of the economy in these regards with certainty. However, this does not 
preclude arriving at some credible guesses by drawing on what information is available and indi-
rect ways of thinking.  
In the period 480-430 BC, the silver from the Laurion mines and the allied tributes31 would 
have increased the supply of money by shifting rightwards the surface ˆmq in Graph (ii) of Figure 2. 
Could it have generated a persistent rise in the general price level or just inflation? In the absence 
of hard evidence, Figueira (1998, 493) rates the likelihood of inflation quite high. He suggests that 
the working hypothesis should be that Athenians experienced “significant” inflation in the 5th cen-
tury because it is unlikely that the supply of “goods and services” increased in proportion to the 
increase in the money supply. Let us concentrate first on the silver flows from Laurion.  
Before they appeared in the markets in the form of currency, bullion and bank deposits, the min-
ing and processing of silver ore expanded employment and incomes, and hence GDP. By implica-
tion, aggregate demand for “goods and services”, should have increased pretty much in proportion 
with their aggregate supply because silver was a tradeable commodity that could be exported freely 
in the form of currency and bullion. If the prices for foodstuffs and other household and enterprise 
implements increased in the short-run due to supply of silver induced excess demand, profit mar-
gins and the exchange rate of the Attic drachma would have tended to increase and by stimulating 
                                                                                                                                                             
their funds in cases of fiscal emergency. In risk management, the larger the emergency pool, the more stable the 
system. Hence, the argument for not each bank managing its risks alone made good sense. However, there is no 
evidence of any scheme on the part of the Athenian financial institutions to manage collectively the risks involved 
in their business.  
31
 Contributions, mainly in currency but also some in kind, that Athens received from its allies in the context of the 
Delian League (478-454 BCE) and the First Athenian Alliance (454-404 BCE) for the purpose of leading their de-
fense against the threat of Persian invasion.  
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imports in the medium run prices would have returned to equilibrium. So with regard to the in-
creased money flows from this source I fail to see how the abundant production of an international-
ly tradeable commodity like silver may lead to “significant” inflation in an open economy. Quite 
likely it led to some transitory inflation, raising particularly the prices of necessities, but over the 
longer run it would leave the general price level unchanged.  
    To corroborate this inference, consider an economy with two goods, say, bread and silver. De-
note the unit price of bread in terms of silver as sbp , i.e. 2 obols of silver per weight unit of bread, 
and the unit price of silver in terms of bread as bsp , i.e. half the weight unit of bread per obol of sil-
ver. By implication, we have 1b ss bp p  . Next assume that the available quantity of silver doubles, 
while the available quantity of bread remains constant. Since double the quantity of silver will buy 
the same quantity of bread, sbp  will increase to 2
s
bp  whereas 
b
sp  will decline to / 2
b
sp , and hence it 
will continue to hold that 1b ss bp p . This proves that, while the increase in the quantity of silver 
changes the relative prices, the general price level remains unchanged because, whatever percent-
age of value silver loses in terms of bread, the latter gains exactly in terms of silver. Does this 
proof generalize to an economy based on so-called “commodity money” with many goods and ser-
vices? It should, provided that the commodity money maintains its integrity and that it is not de-
based, since then it acquires qualities nearly similar to fiat money.32  Does this proof apply to Ath-
ens in classical times? It does because Athens did not mingle up with money supply and guarded 
strenuously against adulteration of its currency.  
However, the case with respect to the large allied tributes in the period 480-430 BC and the spoils 
from Persian treasures donated by Alexander the Great after 330 BC is different. Let us see why with 
reference to the allied tributes. The revenues from this source entered into the coffers of the Athenian 
state and by authority of the Ecclesia of Demos they were employed to finance all sorts of public ex-
penditures. Year by year in the said period, the state raised the wages of public magistrates, soldiers 
and sailors across the board; it spent lavishly in the construction of luxurious public buildings and 
city beautifications; it established programs of social welfare, festivals and other cultural activities, 
etc. As a result, in conjunction with the slower rising supply of labor, the increasing amount and cir-
culation of the allied money raised the wages throughout the economy. Clearly, what we had then 
                                                 
32
 Sussman, Zeira (2003) have shown that commodity money can lead to inflation proper through debasements, 
which act like devaluations.  
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and there was the first ever case of the so-called Dutch disease.33 Wealth in the form of silver coins 
and bullion coming from abroad was spent by the state raising the wages of public servants and ex-
panding the production of non-tradeable goods and services; in turn, faster rising prices in the public 
sector raised the wages and the cost of materials in the private sector; as the latter entered into a 
phase of cost-push inflation, it lost international competitiveness; the exports of tradables slowed 
down, the deficit in the balance of trade widened and had to be covered by increased exports of Attic 
drachmae and bullion, thus leading to losses in the currency’s exchange rate; and as a result the 
economy should have experienced a period of inflation , accompanied by a contraction of the trada-
bles sector.34 Figueira’s (1998, 493) hunch that in the 5th century BC the Athenians experienced “sig-
nificant” inflation may be right. But the culprit was not the large quantities of silver from the Laurion 
mines. The upward spiral in the general price level should have started and persisted from the way in 
which the state spent the wealth from the allied tributes.  
To conclude, the silver from Laurion must have left the general price level unaffected, because the 
Attic drachma was never debased. Excluding the period of the Peloponnesian War (430-400 BC), 
over 150 years of relative peace in the two centuries under consideration, the indications are that the 
economy wide inflation ranged around 1.5% due to the large quantities of silver and bullion that 
poured into Athens from abroad, an particularly because of the way it was spent by the state. Hence, 
while by today’s definition of price stability the general price level in Athens remained stable 
(1.5%<2%), in the U.S. over the period 1960-2015 prices increased at the rate of 3.8% per annum, 
i.e. almost double the rate of 2% for price stability.35 With regard then to the general level of prices, 
economies with money based on a commodity standard have a fundamental advantage over econo-
mies with fiat money, which is issued and systematically devalued by the Fed, either in the course of 
                                                 
33
 More specifically, in the case of Holland heavy income transfers from abroad due to the sale of gas or oil in-
creased domestic spending. This, in turn, drove up the prices of the non-traded goods and services, for which the 
price levels are formed in the home market. Finally, as the higher prices of non-tradables translated into wage in-
creases via inflation indexation, collective bargaining or other processes, manufacturing, the competitive product 
prices of which cannot deviate from world market prices, lost competitiveness and contracted substantially. In the 
case of Great Britain, which had a flexible exchange rate system, exchange rate appreciation due to the oil revenue 
inflows had the same effect, i.e. a major contraction of the manufacturing sector. This explains why the term 
Dutch Disease is sometimes referred to as de-industrialization. 
34
 One could link also the inflationary process to the Dutch type disease that plagued Athens in this period by fol-
lowing the analysis suggested by Imai (2002). However, as the arguments would have taken the presentation far 
afield, I adopted the much simpler approach in the text. 
35
 This rate was computed using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), given as series CPALTT01USA661S in the data  
base of the Federal Reserve Bank of St’ Louis (Link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org).  
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trying to achieve high employment or in complacency and acquiescence to U.S. governments.36  
5. Decentralized money with innocuous government involvement in the U.S. 
While assessing the model of free banking, as framed originally by White (1984/1995), Selgin 
(1988), Selgin, White (1994), and others, Friedman, Schwartz (1986, 8, 11) concluded that:  
History suggests both that any privately generated unit of account will be linked to a commodity and 
that government will not long keep aloof….If free private competitive enterprise can produce a viable 
money without government, it has yet to do so. 
If one scanned the relevant literature at the time they were writing, one would find few details 
about money and banking in classical Athens from which to piece together a model. Hence they 
were justified in invoking the lack of a historical precedent as a condition for the possibility to ever 
emerge “privately produced viable money without government”. 37 But since then highly intensive 
research by economic historians, numismatists, sociologists, political scientists, etc., compactly 
summarized in Bitros, Kyriazis, Economou (2020), has rendered it feasible to make a strong case 
for such a historical precedent that did transpired then and there.  
More specifically, the model of free banking presented in the preceding section stands on histor-
ical grounds solid enough to claim that the Athenian currency functioned in an institutional envi-
ronment in which: a) the state defined a unit of account (Attic drachma), linked it to a commodity 
(silver), and used it in its domestic and foreign transactions; b) drawing on its share of silver from 
the Laurion mines, as well as on its fiscal operations,  the state  acted as a major but not sole pro-
vider of the said currency; c) the state enacted and enforced rules and regulations that aimed at 
safeguarding the integrity of its currency, leaving money and banking markets to operate freely 
under the laws that applied in all markets and the Attic drachma circulated in parallel with all other 
foreign currencies; d) the supply of the currency, silver bullion and credit, i.e. money, and hence 
the latter’s price in terms of goods and services, was determined by competitive forces in the mar-
kets of the economy; and e) all equilibrium level and rate variables like, for example, the prices and 
                                                 
36
 This claim is consistent with the results which have been reported by Rolnick, Weber (1998, 14) who find that:  
…on average, inflation rates are also higher under fiat standards. The average inflation rate for the fi-
at standard observations is 9.17 percent per year; the average inflation rate for the commodity stand-
ard observations is 1.75 percent per year. And, once again, every country in our sample experienced a 
higher rate of inflation in the period during which it was operating under a fiat standard than in the 
period during which it was operating under a commodity standard. 
37
 Certainly these world renowned monetary experts have not held anarchist views. So I do not think that by using 
the terms “without government” they meant the absence of government even from its general institutional and 
regulatory tasks in the economy.  
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quantities of  silver in the forms of currency and bullion, the amount of bank credit and the reserve 
ratio, and the interest rate were determined by uninhibited supply and demand conditions.  
Was money in classical Athens viable? There is no doubt that it was, since the Attic drachma 
became over three centuries equivalent to today’s U.S. dollar in the Eastern Mediterranean and be-
yond.  Was money in classical Athens produced by private agents operating in competitive mar-
kets? Again, there is no doubt that it was, since as explained by reference to Figure 2 all critical 
equilibrium values in the monetary system were determined in open domestic and international 
financial markets free of direct administrative controls. Was money in classical Athens produced 
without government? All available evidence indicates that it was, since the state respected the 
standards it set for the integrity of its currency; by enacting and enforcing rules and regulations, it 
made sure that private agents would not undermine the currency’s integrity and world status; and, 
last but not least, it managed its public finances following Adam Smith’s dictum that “what is pru-
dence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom''. On 
account then of these merits, it is reasonable to ask: Is the Athenian model a viable alternative for 
decentralized money in the U.S., if and when the circumstances become ripe for such a reform? 
Considering that a) it stands on a distinctively successful historical precedent, b) money was 
produced by private agents acting in competitive markets and the government remained aloof but 
not indifferent, since it set up and enforced effective institutions for safeguarding the integrity of 
the currency, and c) the monetary arrangements provided for a system of checks and balances 
between government and free markets that served the best interests of citizens, and hence of de-
mocracy, the answer should be in the positive. The Athenian model of free banking does offer a 
viable framework for decentralized money and it can be easily implemented by adopting the fol-
lowing norms and procedures:   
 The government would define the unit of a Uniform Official Currency (UOC), known in 
the U.S. as the dollar and denoted by the symbol $.  
 The value of $ would be linked to the Implicit Price Index (IPI) of GDP in a base year, say 
2017, by setting 2017IPI 1 . 
 The federal and the state governments, as well as all sorts of public agencies, would be ob-
ligated by law to conduct their accounting and transactions in this unit. Therefore, in view 
of the scale of the public sector in the U.S., this requirement would create strong incentives 
in financial and non-financial private parties to adopt the $ in their dealings.  
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 Financial institutions would be free to issue their own banknotes to serve as medium of ex-
change without any government imposed obligation to convert them into equivalent value 
carrying commodities, like gold or silver, or value carrying assets like stocks, bonds and 
now digital money. However, to render their banknotes acceptable, competition would 
compel banknote issuing financial institutions to provide their customers with conversion 
rights, say into silver, at its price relative to the IPI of GDP. To explain this conversion, as-
sume that in 2017 the price of silver (S) was 0.5 $ per gram and that its index was set at
2017S 1 . By implication, 1 gram of silver bought 0.5 $ worth of GDP. Now let the prices 
of silver in 2018 increase to 2018S 1.1  and of GDP to 2018IPI 1.05 . If in 2018 a bank 
were asked to convert its banknotes into silver, the bank would have to give out 1.048 
(=1.1/1.05) grams of silver for every $ of converted banknotes.38  
 Banknotes denominated in $ would circulate in the U.S. in competition with every other 
domestic and foreign currency.  
 There would be no “lender of last resort” and hence all public and private parties, financial 
and non-financial, would carry the certainty equivalent cost of the particular banknotes and 
the assets held in their portfolios.  
 Suppose the economy in 2018 experienced inflation of 5%, because ceteris paribus financial 
institutions issued an excessive amount of banknotes relative to the available supply of goods 
and services. Would this be a persistent or a transitory equilibrium? It would be transitory, 
because soon the banknote issuing institutions would discover that their demand to cover the 
required silver reserves would raise its price, thus cutting into their profit margins. So they 
would find it profit maximizing in 2019 to start shrinking the supply of banknotes until even-
tually the economy would return to price stability.  
 Instead, suppose that due to technological advancements productivity in 2018 increased 
the supply of goods and services and deflation in the economy reduced the price of GDP 
to 2018IPI 0.98 , leaving that of silver unchanged at 2018S 1 . Would deflation of 2% mark 
a new permanent equilibrium? Rather not, because banknote issuing financial institutions 
                                                 
38
 Since various commodities offered for conversion would provide different degrees of security, one may even 
think of significant differentiation among banknote issuing institutions along this basis. For example, one bank 
might offer conversion rights in silver, another in gold and still another in shares to a portfolio of stocks from a 
wide range of well-known corporations.  
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would find  it to their interest in 2019 to start increasing the supply of banknotes some-
what faster than the supply of goods and services, thus pushing the economy back to 
price stability. 
Additionally the federal government would retain all its prerogatives on behalf of the citizens to 
enact and enforce rules and regulations for protecting the integrity of the U.S. dollar, keeping all 
markets open to potential and observed competition, combating fraud and tax evasion, and mak-
ing sure that through the courts the contracts are respected and the property rights are safeguard-
ed as best as institutionally possible. 
6. Summary of findings and conclusions 
To control the financial crisis that erupted unexpectedly in 2008, the Fed applied an assortment of 
bold policies. They called them “unconventional” and they proved successful owing to some sig-
nificant extent to the cooperation of the U.S. allies and other major trading partners. But if another 
crisis of similar or worse severity erupts, its destructive force may turn out to be uncontrollable be-
cause now the post-war trust of the world in the U.S. leadership has been lost and the Fed by all 
indications has run out of sustainable “bazookas and ammunitions”. Therefore, it is high time that 
the U.S., as issuer of the world’s preeminent currency, prepares ahead of the next major crisis that 
may wreck its economy and create havoc in the international financial system.  
In this context, outstanding proposals for decisive overhauling of the Fed that have long been 
considered “academic” are gaining considerable respectability and attention. Given that the es-
tablished monetary regime in the U.S. has reached its limits and another major crisis would en-
danger gravely the U.S. economy and the international financial order, the increasing interest in 
decentralized monetary regimes like, for example, free banking is natural. To these proposals this 
paper has added the model that evolved in Athens in classical times, i.e. a period during which 
Athens reached the apex of its military, economic, political, cultural, and scientific influence in 
the history of the world. Having explained how it might have functioned in an institutional envi-
ronment in which the government took great interest in the integrity of its silver based currency, 
i.e. the Attic drachma, but without mingling up directly in the operations of the money and bank-
ing industry, this model stands out because, first, it provides a system of checks and balances be-
tween government and free markets that serves the best interests of citizens, and hence of democ-
racy; second, it is characterized by superior structural properties, since all key variables are de-
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termined in decentralized competitive markets by demand and supply forces and the general 
price level remains stable; and, thirdly, it more than meets the demanding standard of the histori-
cal precedent that Friedman, Schwartz (1986, 8, 11) set in the above mentioned quotation. 
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